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EMPATHY, LEGAL STORYTELLING, AND 
THE RULE OF LAW: NEW WORDS, 
OLD WOUNDS?t 
Toni M. Massaro* 
"[T]he object of a law is always general .... [A] law always considers 
the subjects collectively and actions abstractly, never an individual per-
son or a particular action. Thus the law can declare that there will be 
privileges, but it cannot give them to anyone by name .... " 1 
I. THE TREND 
A. Introduction: The Problem and the Contemporary 
Terminology Outlined 
The legal storytelling theme that is the focus of this symposium is 
part of a larger, ongoing intellectual movement. American legal schol-
arship of the past several decades has revealed deep dissatisfaction 
with the abstract and collective focus of law and legal discourse. The 
rebellion against abstraction has, of late, been characterized by a "call 
to context."2 One strand of this complex body of thought argues that 
law should concern itself more with the concrete lives of persons af-
fected by it. One key word in the dialogue is the term "empathy," 
which appears frequently in the work of critical legal studies, feminist, 
and "law and literature" writers. 3 
t © 1989 Toni M. Massaro 
* Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S. 1977, Northwestern; J.D. 1980, William and 
Mary. - Ed. I thank Francis Allen, Stuart Cohn, Jeffrey Harrison, Fred Schauer, Ted 
Schneyer, and Joan Shaughnessy for valuable critiques of earlier versions of this essay. I also 
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1. J. ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE EsSENTIAL ROUSSEAU 34 {L. Blair trans. 
1983). 
2. The phrase "call to context" is Professor Schauer's. 
3. See, e.g., J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EsSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF 
THE LAW (1985); Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); West, 
Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV. 867 (1987); West, Law, 
Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 
134 U. PA. L. REV. 817 (1986); Yudof, "Tea at the Palace of Hoon": The Human Voice in Legal 
Rules, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 589 (1988). More recently, a symposium that addresses these issues 
chose "passion" as its key word to represent (roughly) the same concept. Reason, Passion, and 
Justice Brennan: A Symposium, IO CARDOZO L. REV. 1 passim (1988). 
Legal writers who appeal to empathy likely are drawing from work in "interpretive sociol-
ogy," which appeals to the concepts of empathy and interpretation and to subjective meaning as 
vehicles for understanding social life. This approach to social life rejects positivist models of 
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These scholars applaud Noonan's well-known caution about rules. 
He wrote: "Rules are formalized repetition. They enforce a conform-
ity which may be merciless and inhuman. They embody power."4 
Legal discourse may exaggerate this tendency in two ways. First, 
traditional legal discourse equates logic with "reason" and "under-
standing." Feminist jurisprudence in particular challenges this equa-
tion, and argues that feeling and imagination also are important 
aspects of reason and understanding. 5 Second, legal discourse and 
legal analysis typically emphasize the use of general, acontextual prin-
ciples to solve concrete legal problems. Arguments against this ap-
proach come from many quarters. 6 
Closely related to the empathy theme are arguments in favor of 
more individualized justice. Lawyers are encouraged to personalize 
their clients - to "tell their story."7 Legal scholars are invited to use 
stories to provoke changes in law teaching, in law scholarship, and in 
society beyond academia. Judges and other legal decisionmakers in 
particular are admonished to consider context, and to recognize the 
unique life story that each litigant represents. The rule-of-law model, 
or "law for law's sake," should not block judges' experiential under-
standing of the world - their "practical reason" - or be invoked to 
deny or devalue the actual human concerns at stake in a given legal 
setting.8 
Cases like Brown v. Board of Education, 9 it is argued, should be 
seen as a simple truth about the harm in segregation that any ten-year 
old black child understands. 10 Lawyers should argue this simple 
truth. Judges should respect it. Law should enforce it. That is, legal 
cases should be approached as concrete human stories that take into 
account our different human voices. These two terms - "story" and 
"voice" - are important new words in this area of legal writing. 11 
knowledge and rationality. See R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCI-
ENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 25-27 (1983). 
4. J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 19 (1976). 
5. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 3, at 1577. 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 52-53. Many, but not all, of these arguments draw 
upon Richard Rorty's work in philosophy. See R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF 
NATURE (1979). 
7. See, e.g., Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and 
the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1983). 
8. See Henderson, supra note 3, at 1587; see also J.B. WHITE, supra note 3, at 133-36, 168-91. 
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
10. Yudof, supra note 3, at 589-90; see also Getman, Voices, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 577, 584-85 
(1988). 
11. It likely stems from Carol Gilligan's rather astonishingly popular work, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE (1982). See also J.B. WHITE, supra note 3, at 34, 41-42, 47-48; Getman, supra note 10, at 
577, passim; Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Minow, The Supreme Court, 
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One problem underscored in this scholarship is that individual, 
concrete human voices and abstract, general legal rules often conflict. 
Written laws are impersonal. Moreover, the rule-of-law model trains 
us - that is, legal personnel - to "treat like cases alike," and to de-
fine relevant similarities generally. The purposes of the written law 
according to this model are thought to go beyond individuals. This 
focus, say some legal scholars, can be destructive. It may lead to a 
disregard for individuals, and may exalt logical consistency and pre-
dictability over compassion and substantive justice. Therefore, the 
writers urge, lawyers, judges, and scholars should not suppress emo-
tion and experiential understanding. Empathy, human stories, and 
different voices should be woven into the tapestry of legal scholarship, 
legal training, law formulation, legal counseling and advocacy, and 
law application and enforcement. 
B. ''Empathy," ''Rule of Law," and ''Legal Storytelling" Defined 
At this point, the terms "empathy," "rule of law," and "legal 
storytelling" require closer scrutiny. Defining these terms is not easy, 
because many writers use the terms without clarifying their intended 
meaning, or define the terms differently from other writers. Moreover, 
the words often are used less as precise descriptions than as symbols of 
much broader concepts. 
1. Empathy 
In a recent article, Professor Lynne Henderson notes the prevalent 
use of the term "empathy" in legal works, and offers a much needed 
clarification of the term. 12 She identifies three aspects of empathy or 
empathic capacity: 
1. The capacity to perceive others as having one's own goals, inter-
ests and affects; 
2. imaginative experience of the situation of another; and 
3. the distress response that accompanies this experiencing 
which may (but not must) lead to action to ease the pain of another. 13 
In discussing the relevant psychological literature and the current 
speculations about what determines the empathic capacity of a human 
being, Henderson notes that the environment of an individual seems to 
1986 Term -Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); Sherry, Civic Virtue 
and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986). See generally 
Shaughnessy, Gilligan's Travels, 7 J. L. & INEQUALITY 1 (1988); Williams, Deconstructing Gen-
der, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989). 
12. Henderson, supra note 3; see also Henderson, The Dialogue of Heart and Head, 10 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 123 (1988). 
13. Henderson, supra note 3, at 1579-82. 
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play a major role. That is, our socialization and learning and early 
childhood experiences - particularly experiences with separation and 
attachment - principally determine our ability to "empathize" in 
later life. 14 Thus, for example, someone who has suffered pain is more 
likely to personalize the suffering of others and be affected more 
strongly by it. 15 Gender per se does not appear to affect empathic 
capacity. 
External conditions also may influence our empathic capacity, and 
may cause us to ignore our empathic distress response. In particular, 
some writers argue, legal training can encourage us to block or inhibit 
empathic responses because it deems certain factors, including our 
emotions, to be "irrelevant."16 As Henderson puts it, "the ideological 
structures of legal discourse and cognition block affective and phe-
nomenological argument." 17 The result, she says, is that a mode of 
understanding that is best described as "empathy" is "foreclosed" or 
sent "underground."18 The loss she perceives in this approach to legal 
discourse is that our legal decisions and their justification fail to con-
sider the full range of human experience and to appreciate situations 
of others. 
2. Rule-of-Law 
The term rule-of-law model is generally defined as a model that 
requires those who exercise government authority to conform strictly 
to the rules. "For our purposes, ... its most relevant meaning is con-
veyed by .. .'a government of laws and not of men.' ... [G]overnment 
by rules takes precedence over government by will of those holding 
official power."19 The underlying concept is that "formal rationality," 
14. Id. at 1583; cf Goleman, Researchers Trace Empathy's Roots to Infancy, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 28, 1989, at Cl, col. 1 (reporting on recent research that suggests there may be a neural 
basis for empathy). 
15. Henderson, supra note 3, at 1583 (citing A. BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OP 
THOUGHT AND ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 316 (1986)). 
16. See id. at 1588. 
17. Id. at 1575. 
18. Id. at 1576. 
19. M. KADISH & s. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 41 (1973); see also Michelman, 
Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Contradictory World, in JUSTIFICATION 71, 72-73 
(Nomos XXVIII, J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1986) ("The notion of decision according to law 
implies comparison of the case with some external standard that in some degree constrains or 
points to one or another decision, if it does not fully determine the outcome. The external norm 
must have some prescriptive force.") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); Posner, Legal 
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 179, 180-81 (1986) (describing the multiple ways in which the terms "legal formal-
ism" and "legal realism" have been used over the years); Schauer, Formalism, 91 YALE L.J. 509, 
510 (1988) ("At the heart of the word 'formalism,' in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept 
of decisionmaking according to rule.") (emphasis in original). 
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which means consistent application of prior stated rules, should 
prevail. 
The argument against formal rationality as a method of legal deci-
sionmaking is that it may prevail to the detriment of substantive ra-
tionality. A judge can invoke a legal principle - for example, that 
black men are property - and ignore the impact of that principle on 
people. The judge's feelings and the feelings of black men are irrele-
vant to the dispute. Substantive justice, which means a fair or good 
result, is sacrificed in favor of consistent application of the legal princi-
ple. 20 Moreover, the judge can claim that a result is good simply be-
cause it upholds prior-stated law. 
The popular image of lawyers is that we are committed to formal 
rationality. We are trained to cabin "empathic" responses and remain 
steadfast in our commitment to legal principles despite emotional dis-
sonance. An anecdote, perhaps apocryphal,21 about Justice O'Connor 
confirms this image. The story goes that, while a state court judge, 
Justice O'Connor was compelled by law to impose a strict sentence on 
a criminal defendant. After she dispassionately announced her verdict 
in open court, she retired to her chambers and wept. That is, Justice 
O'Connor maintained her professional discipline and curbed any per-
sonal or emotional desire to deviate from the prior-stated, popular 
legal standards. This was proper and commendable judicial conduct, 
according to conventional wisdom. 22 
Increasing numbers of legal scholars decry this assumed tendency 
of legal professionals to invoke and apply the rule-of-law, yet shield 
themselves from the emotional and moral consequences of their ac-
tions. 23 Justice O'Connor's private anguish, according to some people, 
What I mean by formalism ... is a commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the possi-
bility of, a method of legal justification that can be clearly contrasted to open-ended disputes 
about the basic terms of social life, disputes that people call ideological, philosophical, or 
visionary .... The formalism I have in mind characteristically invokes impersonal purposes, 
policies, and principles as an indispensable component of legal reasoning. 
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564 (1983). 
20. The law controls the factors that are "relevant," or, to put it another way, that fall within 
the lines. And, as Unger has observed, "[e]verything will depend on where one draws the line." 
R. UNGER, LAW JN MODERN SOCIETY 204 (1976). Yudof has observed that "[a]ny particular 
legal ordering spun from the human imagination may be just or unjust. But the ordering itself 
determines what facts are necessary to adjudication and thus the relevance of particular human 
voices." Yudof, supra note 3, at 590. 
21. I do not recall the source of this anecdote, and cannot vouch for its accuracy. I acknowl-
edge the worrisome possibility, suggested to me by Professor Fred Schauer, that such' stories may 
be more likely to be told about women judges than about men. 
22. Cf Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U: L. REV. 63, 78 
(1980) ("[T]he standard conception [of the lawyer's role] calls for a sharp separation of private 
and professional morality .... [which] requires a public endorsement, as well as private adop-
tion, of the extreme strategy of detachment."). 
23. Cover made this point in Justice Accus(!d. He wrote: 
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should not have been confined to her chambers, but should have fig-
ured in her public deliberations and in the legal result. If application 
of the penal code made Justice O'Connor weep, then her pain should 
have alerted her to the possibility that the code should not, in that 
case, have been so applied. Legal decisionmaking should not discount 
feelings, whether of the litigants or of other relevant actors in our legal 
dramas. Our emotions and affect should be as much a part of normal 
legal discourse as the "objective" legal rules. 
3. Legal Storytelling 
Richard Delgado is correct when he notices that "[e]veryone has 
been writing stories these days."24 Moreover, they are telling stories 
to many different audiences, to promote a broad range of different 
ends. The participants in this symposium, for example, describe or use 
multiple sorts of stories: stories that bridge, 25 providing connections 
between people of different experience, stories that explode Qike gre-
nades) certain ways of thinking,26 stories that mask, devalue, or sup-
press other stories, 27 stories that consolidate, validate, heal, and fortify 
(like therapy),28 and even stories that maim or "spirit murder"29 and 
so should not be told at all. 30 
The participants likewise describe different sorts of audiences for 
their stories. Some are stories told by legal scholars, which are di-
rected at other members of the academic community.31 Other stories 
are told by lawyers to judges or juries. 32 Other writers discuss "stock 
The judicial conscience is an artful dodger and rightfully so. Before it will concede that a 
case is one that presents a moral dilemma, it will hide in the nooks and crannies of the 
professional ethics, run to the cave of role limits, seek the shelter of separation of powers. 
R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 201 (1975) {describing judges' reactions to slavery). 
24. Delgado, Legal Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. 
L. REV. 2411, 2411 {1989). 
25. See, e.g., Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Matsuda, Public Sanction of Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's 
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on For· 
mal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989). 
26. See, e.g., Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2382 (1989); Delgado, supra note 24. 
27. See, e.g .. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280 
(1989); Bell, supra note 26; Delgado, supra note 24; Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court 
and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152 (1989); Williams, supra note 25. 
28. See, e.g., Delgado supra note 24, at 2437. 
29. The phrase is Patricia Williams'. See Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The 
Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987). 
30. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 25 (arguing for criminalizing racist hate speech). 
31. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 26; Delgado, supra note 24. 
32. See Cunningham, supra note 25; Williams, supra note 25. 
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stories"33 told by judges to the community34 and told by the commu-
nity about itself,35 and offer competing "counterstories," that are told 
by outgroups to themselves, or that can be directed at "ingroups" in 
an effort to convert, or even deconstruct the stock story.36 
This storytelling theme ties in to the empathy theme in several 
ways. Stories tend to work directly from "experiential understand-
ing," which the empathy writers encourage us to use. Consequently, 
narrative may be a particularly powerful means of facilitating em-
pathic understanding: a concrete story comes closest to actual experi-
ence and so may evoke our empathic distress response more readily 
than abstract theory. Telling stories can move us to care, and hence 
pave the way to action. To the extent that lawyers and judges are 
engaged in acts of persuasion - which they clearly are - legal schol-
arship reasonably should be interested both in how narratives, in gen-
eral, tend to "work" (persuade), and in which ones, in particular, 
succeed.37 
There is, however, more to the legal storytelling theme than the 
exploration of effective advocacy techniques. Like the writing on em-
pathy, storytelling is part of an overall "call to context," which is di-
rected at jurisprudential and normative ends. Those who encourage 
legal storytelling and those who favor empathic decisionmaking seem 
to share at least two concerns. One concern is that legal theory and 
legal discourse often are too removed from individual experience. 
Academics, judges, and lawyers often juggle concepts and spar with 
abstractions, without consulting the human concerns actually at issue 
in their deliberations. Stories can shock them back into sensation, into 
life as it is versus how we talk about it. Stories are one way to bring 
law down to life, to the people, "to the ground." This reflects, I be-
lieve, a broader suspicion of traditional jurisprudence's emphasis on 
acontextual rules and about the way that Western epistemology tends 
to describe or interpret experience and understanding. 
The second shared concern of at least some of the legal storytelling 
advocates is normative. To favor bringing things down to context, to 
individual storytellers and their unique experience, is to favor the 
"protestant" view of interpretive authority that Professor David 
33. This phrase is Gerald L6pez's. See L6pez, The Internal Structure of Lawyering: Lay 
Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984). 
34. See, e.g .. Luban, supra note 27. 
35. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 27. 
36. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 24; Matsuda, supra note 25. 
37. A provocative question, which I think could easily be the subject of an entire separate 
symposium, is this: Why is Patricia Williams' "sausage story" so marvelously, unforgettably 
"good"? See Williams, supra note 25, at 2130-31. 
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Luban describes. 38 This view implies that all voices are equal, and 
that diversity of voice should be a paramount political value. Human 
dignity - each storyteller is an end, not a means - seems to be an 
implicit normative principle of the legal storytelling approach. 39 A 
further normative implication is, I believe, that our ultimate goal 
should be "minimalist rules,'' in order to maximize multi-voicedness 
and freedom. 
Beyond such very general shared concerns and values, however, I 
find little consensus among these writers about the implications of the 
call to context. For example, some writers suggest that we need rules 
that silence some voices, and fortify other storytellers who, histori-
cally, have been silenced. This is, of course, inconsistent with a view 
that each voice counts, regardless of its message. Some writers invoke 
the call to context to further the critique of liberalism. Still others 
invoke "voice" to encourage a shift away from individualism to the so-
called ethic of care. For these reasons, the "call to context" is com-
plex, often contradictory, and difficult to summarize. This essay is a 
preliminary attempt to make some sense of this movement, and to ex-
press some doubts and hopes about its future course. 
II. CRITIQUE 
A call for more "empathy," more human "stories," and more lib-
erated "voices" has intuitive and immediate appeal. Many people, 
myself included, agree that individuals should be noticed, heard, and 
respected by the law, and that current legal discourse may undermine 
or undervalue these concerns in serious and painful ways. I write not 
to reject or discredit this claim, but to suggest that the new terminol-
ogy may not be helpful; to express several concerns about the limita-
tions of the "call to context"; and to encourage a shift in focus to what 
I believe is the deeper malady that triggers the criticism that the law is 
"unempathetic" to individual needs. I focus my remarks primarily on 
the application of the empathy, or "context," discourse to the work of 
judges, rather than to lawyers, legislators, or legal scholars. 
A. The Terminology 
As an analytical tool, the term "empathy" is not very helpful. Pro-
38. Luban, supra note 27. 
39. For an excellent discussion and sensitive critique of the legal storytelling movement see 
Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 543, 578-81 (1988). See also Bartlett, Storytelling (Book Review), 1987 DUKE. L.J. 760 
(noting that storytelling can be used equally for progressive reform and for other, contradictory 
purposes). 
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fessor Henderson correctly notes that although "[e]mpathy has be-
come a favorite word in critical and feminist scholarship[,] . . . it is 
never defined or described - it is seemingly tossed in as a 'nice' word 
in opposition to something bad or undesirable."40 Her clarification of 
the empathy phenomenon, however, helps explain why the word is of 
limited use when applied to concrete legal problems. 
First, the term is borrowed from psychological literature. This ob-
viously does not discredit it. as a legal term, but it does suggest that it 
may have a different meaning and function when exported to the unfa-
miliar context of law. Psychological theories about empathy and em-
pathic understanding presuppose a setting in which law rarely 
operates: ·one person feeling the distress of another person. If a judge 
(one person) were asked only to consider and experience the distress of 
one other person, then the concept of empathy might prove a signifi-
cant tool for describing and improving the judging process. But the 
judge in an adversary system such as ours must empathize with, or 
"stand in the shoes of," several people, or, more often, business organi-
zations, the government, or other representative groups. The judge 
hears conflicting "stories," and must order competing "voices." Of 
course, an empathic person will better "hear" all stories - that is, 
"both sides" - than one who heeds only one voice. This insight is 
well understood, though, and may not require extended consideration. 
The context and functions of psychology differ from that of law in 
numerous other ways relevant to the empathy phenomenon.41 For ex-
ample, the psychiatrist (or mental health counselor) has no set time 
within which the psychological intervention, such as therapy, must be 
completed; a legal decisionmaker does. The psychiatrist is not ex-
pected to, or in conventional psychotherapy allowed to, judge a pa-
tient, let alone sentence her to death; legal decisionmakers must 
judge. 42 The psychiatrist has the opportunity for repeated interactions 
with the patient over an extended period of time, in private settings, 
with no other people present; the judge may only see the parties' law-
yers, not the parties themselves, usually in a public courtroom during 
brief, episodic encounters. When the parties do appear, the setting is 
40. Henderson, supra note 3, at 1578. 
41. My colleague Walter Weyrauch has developed a comparison of "legal therapy" and 
"psychological therapy," in which he points out differences between them and argues that legal 
therapy is, in many ways, more effective. W. Weyrauch, Some Propositions That Speak for Legal 
over Psychiatric Counseling (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). 
42. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983) (describing the "jurispathic" role of courts and their essentially 
coercive nature). Of course, when expert psychological testimony is used by law - such as in 
making predictions of future dangerousness or assessing legal insanity - the psychiatrist is con-
tributing to judgments that carry severe sanctions, including capital punishment. 
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hardly intimate or otherwise conducive to "knowing" someone. 
Either empathy advocates must favor radical restructuring of court 
procedures to make them more congenial to "contextual" justice,43 or 
they mean something different from this strong sense of "empathy" -
some weaker phenomenon that can happen in public courtroom set-
tings, through lawyer representatives. 
I believe these differing missions of law and psychiatry, and the 
functional restrictions of law, make the deeper meaning of "empathy" 
useful in psychology, but dramatically less so in law.44 It is no won-
der, then, that when pressed into service in the complicated, dynamic 
and unfamiliar real-world territory of legal conflicts, the psychological 
term "empathy" becomes little more than a soft, "nice" word. 
I also have reservations about Professor Henderson's suggestion 
that a refined appreciation of the empathy phenomenon offers a dis-
tinctive tool for analyzing legal decisions. Her specific examples of a 
breakthrough of empathic understanding - Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion 45 and of empathic failure - Bowers v. Hardwick 46 are not self-
proving. Each decision can be supported or condemned on different 
grounds. Brown, which abolished separate-but-equal schools, may be 
read simply as a long-overdue realization that separate is not equal: a 
straightforward constitutional analysis. Or it may have been an emo-
tional, adverse response to the harsh effects of discrimination on 
school-aged black children. Hardwick, which upheld the Georgia sod-
omy statute, may be read simply as a refusal to include in our cata-
logue of individual rights the right to engage in certain types of sexual 
activity47-also routine constitutional analysis. Or it may have been 
an emotional, adverse response to homosexuality. The opinion cites 
history and scripture, suggesting still other bases for the result. 
43. I am unaware of any such proposal, although the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
movement comes close. The absence of such proposals is striking and significant. As Frank 
Michelman has observed: "[T]he reality and even the possibility of legalist justification have 
been under sharp and sustained attack in this country for sixty years and more, and yet the 
attackers, so far as I know, have not advocated abolition of the courts ..•• " Michelman, supra 
note 19, at 83. 
44. A lawyer argues for an empathic distress response. Hers is an appeal for particular legal 
action and not - in the end - for mere empathic understanding. She is saying, as many of this 
symposium's participants are saying, that a given story deserves to be heard and heeded. This 
type of advocacy is not, to my knowledge, part of the psychiatrist's traditional professional role. 
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Henderson, supra note 3, at 1593-609. 
46. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see Henderson, supra note 3, at 1638-50. 
47. At least one court, however, has interpreted Hardwick not as a judgment favoring hetero-
sexuality over homosexuality, but as a judgment that the right to privacy does not extend to 
sexual activity outside of marriage. Thus, a Maryland law proscribing oral sex was held constitu-
tional, as applied to unmarried heterosexuals. See Schochet v. Maryland, 75 Md. App. 314, 541 
A.2d 183 (1988); Anti-Sodomy Law May Be Applied to Consenting Unmarried Heterosexuals, 14 
Fam. L. Rep. 1380 (1988). 
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"Traditional legal thinking" thus was not necessarily the villain in 
Hardwick, and "empathic understanding" was not necessarily the 
hero in .Brown. 
Explaining these results or analyzing what "really" determines the 
rulings of the United States Supreme Court or of lower court judges is 
a confounding and complicated endeavor, as the depth and variety of 
legal scholarship on this topic proves. I submit that the task of 
describing and defending choices about what should happen in these 
cases is both a more important and more difficult task. Moreover, I 
believe that the term "empathy" does not help us measurably in these 
endeavors. To say, for example, that "[t]he goal of the law ... should 
be to encourage ... empathic intersubjectivity"48 - an "empathic and 
loving community"49 does not begin to answer whether affirmative ac-
tion laws or sodomy laws deserve support, unless "empathy" means 
far more than the psychological definition implies. The "empathy" 
concept does not offer reasons why human distress is something we 
should alleviate, or criteria for choosing whose distress should trigger 
our response. The residual meaning, and potential usefulness of the 
term for law, therefore seem to be indistinguishable from that of many 
other terms, such as compassion, tolerance, justice, equity, or simple 
human kindness. 
Judicial decisions surely are explainable, at least in part, by a 
judge's ability to understand, "hear," or empathize with certain liti-
gants. 50 But we already know that. Moreover, Professor Henderson's 
reading of the psychological literature suggests that our empathic ca-
pacity is determined, to a large extent, by our upbringing. This means 
that judges, as human beings, cannot empathize with all litigants. 
"Law" likewise cannot "empathize" with everyone equally. All 
stories cannot be given equal value. To do so would deny the ordering 
of interests inherent to law. For example, Professor Matsuda asks that 
we give greater value to the victim's story than to that of the first 
amendment absolutist, or to that of the promoter of racial hatred.51 
To criminalize the telling of any story is to silence that voice. She 
48. West, supra note 3, at 863. 
49. Id. at 860-61. 
50. This would seem to be especially true at the trial court level, where the judge has per-
sonal contact with the parties. At the appellate level, the judge's only personal contact is with 
the parties' lawyers. In some cases, even this contact will not occur if the case is decided without 
oral arguments. Moreover, appellate judges have limited fact-finding powers. Ted Schneyer has 
observed, in his reaction to an earlier version of this essay, that the empathy writers' emphasis on 
the role of experiential understanding may therefore turn legal academics' attention more toward 
the trial, rather than the appeal, as the paradigm legal event; and to the jury, rather than the 
judge, as the paradigm legal decisionmaker. 
51. See Matsuda, supra note 25. 
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wants the law to assure that this person will not incline our hearts, or 
persuade members of our community to heed this story. The "proper" 
ordering of voices thus seems to be the underlying fundamental issue. 
The significant modern questions thus are not whether judges and 
"law" should "empathize," or whether stories are exceptional win-
dows to experience, but with whom should we empathize - why, 
when, and according to what procedures? Which stories should law 
privilege? Which stories are profane? These are, of course, very famil-
iar questions about law, which are no less intractable when addressed 
with new terminology. 
B. The Rule-of-Law Model as Villain 
Most writers who argue for more empathy in the law concede that 
law must resort to some conventions and abstract principles. That is, 
they do not claim that legal rules are, as rules, intrinsically sinister. 
Rather, they argue that we should design our legal categories and pro-
cedures in a way that encourages the decisionmakers to consider indi-
vidual persons and concrete situations. Generalities, abstractions, and 
formalities should not dominate the process. The law should be flexi-
ble enough to take emotion into account, and to respond openly to the 
various "stories" of the people it controls. We should, as I have said, 
move toward "minimalist" law. 
Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules 
are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law 
model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skep-
ticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists ques-
tion the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive 
justice.52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal 
52. See generally J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 165-66 (1963); H.L.A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-50 (1961); M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW 25 (1977); R. UNGER, supra note 20, at 52-57, 192-223; Barnett, Foreword: Can Justice and 
the Rule of Law Be Reconciled?, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 597 (1988); Kennedy, Legal 
Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 377-91 (1973); Schauer, supra note 19, at 509; Thompson, The 
Role of the Rule of Law in the Liberal State, 1 NATAL U. L. & Socv. REV. 126 (1986); Tushnet, 
Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH L. REV. 1502 (1985). A complicated 
strand of the attack on the "Rule of Law" appears in feminist jurisprudence and in particular in 
the writings of Professor Robin West. She claims that "the Rule of Law does not value intimacy 
- its official value is autonomy," West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 58 
(1988), and that it does not recognize "the contradiction which characterizes women's, but not 
men's lives: while we value the intimacy we find so natural, we are endangered by the invasion 
and dread the intrusion in our lives which intimacy entails, and we long for individuation and 
independence." Id. at 59. In making her claim, as I understand it, Professor West is using the 
term "Rule of Law" far more broadly than I am - to mean the prevailing jurisprudence in 
American (patriarchal) society. Her criticism of that model therefore proceeds from a different 
point and is directed at a deeper, systemic problem in our legal system. I do not think that she 
would argue that, in a post-patriarchal world, procedural regularity would be abandoned or 
formal rationality would disappear as one part of a just legal system. 
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decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by 
reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and expe-
rience. 53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential de-
bate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have 
suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In 
this regard, I have several observations. 
My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If 
the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," 
then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. 54 But our actual stat-
utory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular 
(unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. 
"Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship," 
"negligence," or "freedom of speech" - to name only a few legal con-
cepts - hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable 
application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining 
sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish 
spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas. 
Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the 
indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle varia-
tions in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of dis-
covering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different 
"stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, 
and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort 
of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking 
popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate 
law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain 
guiding principles. 55 
As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and 
fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations. 
The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in 
decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's 
own experiences -including the experiences that seem to determine a 
person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illu-
minate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal 
results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at 
times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legi-
53. See, e.g., Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). For a description 
of the Critical Legal Studies critique of legalism, and a cogent, thoughtful response, see 
Michelman, supra note 19. 
54. See Michelman, supra note 19, at 86. 
55. The law school emphasis on the indeterminacy of rules may be exaggerated, in part be-
cause of professors' tendency to focus on difficult appellate. cases. See Schauer, Judging in a 
Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717 (1988). 
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timization of results that may be better explained by extralegal (in-
cluding, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the 
facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers, 56 all of which may go un-
stated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking 
therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite 
our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal. 
Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not 
necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and 
empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one impor-
tant example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended 
standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's 
prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the 
defendant. 57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action 
to make the law more specific - more formalized. Rape shield stat-
utes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically 
defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, 
except in limited, justifiable situations. 58 In this case, one can make a 
persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain 
these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a 
triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, 
some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclina-
tions, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example 
thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least 
some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the 
principle oflegality is potentially most critical for people who are least 
understood by the decisionmakers - in this example, women - and 
hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings. 
A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply 
ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some pro-
cedural regularity - "law for law's sake" - because it lends stasis 
and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even within our most inti-
mate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other 
56. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 52, at 130; Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Sub· 
stantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); Weyrauch, Law as Mask - Legal Ritual 
and Relevance, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 710-11 (1978). 
This argument against legality is different from one that claims that rules chill empathy. 
Here the concern is that rules may be illusions or masks. We claim judges follow rules, but they 
in fact follow extra-legal instincts that are wrapped in rules' clothing. That is, stated rules do not 
constrain (or chill) after all. 
57. See generally, Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 
77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977); Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Galvin, Shielding Rape 
Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 
763 (1986); Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome 
Issue and Its Implications/or Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395 (1985). 
58. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 412. 
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party to follow them. 59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can de-
stroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or 
"substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create ex-
pectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. 
The modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actu-
ally may encourage human relationships. 60 
These points together suggest that "legality," as we actually expe-
rience it in American culture, is not the natural enemy of empathy. 
When pared to its roots, the "empathy" theme therefore seems not to 
be a call for more empathy, but for a different ordering of our em-
pathic responses. It represents a hope that certain specific, different 
and previously disenfranchised voices - such a~ those of blacks and 
women and poor people and homosexuals - will be heard, and will 
prevail This is not a call to conversation; it is convert-sation. For 
example, Professor Henderson's condemnation of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick may be read as a call for more empa-
thy for homosexuals and less empathy for people who are fearful of, 
incensed about, or otherwise disturbed by homosexuality. This appeal 
is not necessarily an indictment of legality, or even of any particular 
legal principle - whether it is "equal protection" or "right to pri-
vacy." Nor is it an endorsement of storytelling as an intrinsically good 
act: a homophobic story is told by a human being too. Rather, the 
empathy discourse implies a political and ethical agenda, which in-
volves making choices among competing values or sets of feeling. Ad-
herence to "law for law's sake" therefore poses a problem only if one 
deems that particular law or its application to be foolish, cruel, nar-
row, or shortsighted. 61 
59. See, e.g., Weyrauch, The Family as Small Group, in GROUP DYNAMIC LAW: EXPOSI-
TION AND PRACTICE, 153 (D. Funk ed. 1988). 
Kundera captures this sense when he describes the law of personal relationships as follows: 
[E]very love relationship is based on unwritten conventions rashly agreed upon by the 
lovers during the first weeks of their love. On the one hand, they are living a sort of dream; 
on the other, without realizing it, they are drawing up the fine print of their contracts like 
the most hard-nosed of lawyers. 0 Lovers! Be wary during those perilous first days! If you 
serve the other party breakfast in bed, you will be obliged to continue same in perpetuity or 
face charges of animosity and treason! 
M. KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETTING 36 (1981). 
60. The inconsistent application of "rules" can be psychologically destructive. The famous 
studies by Seligman on the effects on animals of noncontingent negative reinforcement demon-
strate this in a dramatic fashion. See M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVEL-
OPMENT, AND DEATH (1975). 
61. As Galligan has written: 
The simple point is that once the substantive requirements of a theory of justice have been 
applied, there is no remainder to which the idea of formal justice refers. It is the substantive 
principles of the particular theory that regulate the distribution of benefits and burdens, and 
so determine how individuals are to be treated .... The precept to treat like cases alike is 
satisfied by the rational application of a substantive theory of justice. 
D. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS 160 (1986). That is, the rule-of-law model - which 
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I agree with the instincts - that is, with the outcomes - that 
these empathy writers seem to favor. I nevertheless believe that we 
cannot intelligently further a particular political agenda, such as per-
mitting homosexuals to engage in private, consensual intercourse, 
without invoking such acontextual principles as individual autonomy, 
the value of sexuality, and appropriate limits on state power to inter-
vene in private affairs. 62 Concrete stories that illustrate why a con-
trary rule is mean-spirited and deeply alienating for some human 
beings would (and should) support that claim, but "hurtfulness" alone 
will not persuade many people to change the rules. Rather, this hurt-
ful character must be evaluated in the context of some philosophy of 
social justice, some (abstract) theory of law. As Professor Sylvia Law 
recently said: 
The unnecessary human suffering caused by laws that punish sexual inti-
macy should be a critical component of constitutional analysis. 
Yet, to evaluate individual interests in sexual expression solely in 
terms of avoidance of harm is inappropriately narrow .... [T]he core 
human importance of sexuality suggests that our constitutional visions of 
liberty and equality should encompass a more affirmative perspective on 
sexuality than simply the avoidance of state-inflicted danger and pain. 63 
That is, it is not only "hurtful" to discriminate against blacks and 
homosexuals and women - it also is wrong as a matter of principled 
ordering of relevant interests in American constitutional law. Not all 
hurtful rules, however, will be "wrong" rules. 64 For example, a rule 
that requires testing for AIDS may not be "wrong," though it may 
includes the notions that laws should be "prospective, open and clear,'' see Thompson, supra note 
52, at 126, and that similar cases should be treated similarly - itself is benign if the underlying 
substantive law is benign. 
62. In fact, one cannot talk about the issue without moving beyond context. What, for exam-
ple, do we mean when we say "homosexual"? We are not, I assume, talking only about Mr. 
Hardwick's experiences. Nor are we talking about all of his life experiences. We are limiting our 
"context," to certain aspects of his life - ones we deem "relevant" to the legal question. For an 
in-depth exploration of this problem of rules and "context," see F. Schauer, Three Comments on 
Context (unpublished paper presented at Harvard Law School, Apr. 1988) (on file with author). 
63. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender. 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 227-28 
(footnote omitted). 
64. Professor Joan Shaughnessy examines this problem of pain - how law hurts - in the 
following passage: 
In the course of their work, lawyers and judges are frequently required to inflict great 
pain .... 
. . • It is difficult to inflict pain, and the more intimately we know another person, the 
more difficult it becomes. To know all may well be to forgive all, and that the law cannot 
afford .... 
. . . In short, the professional roles we assume as lawyers and judges have built into them 
a protective distancing mechanism, a mechanism explained by the need for lawyers and 
judges to inflict pain in the course of carrying out the law's coercive power in our society. 
Shaughnessy, supra note 11, at 23-24. Indeed, much of her elegant essay tracks the concerns I 
express here. Cj Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (observing that 
"[l]egal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death"). 
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well be "hurtful" to those affected. We therefore need to explain and 
justify "right" and "wrong" in terms of our political and constitu-
tional doctrines, and underlying values. 
A final, and important, observation is that our legal procedures do 
not block the lawyer's opportunity to tell a client's story. Modem trial 
procedures do not prevent the lawyer who represents the victim of 
state-inflicted danger and pain from bringing this anguish to the 
factfinder's attention. Client stories thus can be, and often are,· both 
told and heard, even when reported judicial opinions fail to mention 
these details of trial-level dramas. 65 Human suffering is not "irrele-
vant" as a matter of American law or procedure. Yet it is clear that 
some peoples' suffering is consistently discounted or denied by the 
humans who draft and enforce qur laws. Also clear is that legal rules 
and their enforcement restrict the range of discourse, 66 and do so in 
ways that tend to reflect (and sometimes, to magnify) the prejudices, 
empathic blindness, and insensitivities of the dominant communities. 
The voices of the dominant communities typically receive the valida-
tion of rules, so that other voices lack this "reification" and validation. 
But the problem often originates in the community - in us - not in 
the written rule. Law is not merely a cause; it is also an effect. "Le-
galism" alone does not cause slavery, discrimination, or gross dispari-
ties in wealth and social goods. To claim that it does is to lay the 
blame for cruelty outside the human hearts and minds that invent it. 
Laws surely reinforce and thus can entrench the status quo, but are, at 
root, human inventions. To return to one of Henderson's examples, 
the "empathy-blocker" in Hardwick likely was deep-seated antipathy 
toward homosexuals in the dominant heterosexual community, 67 and 
not the rule-of-law model, the Constitution, legal training, or judicial 
personality. That is, some human voices were heard in Hardwick, but 
not the "right" ones. 
65. Although his voice did not prevail, the voice of infant Joshua DeShaney was heard all the 
way up to the United States Supreme Court. Joshua was beaten by his father so severely that he 
became brain-damaged. A lawsuit was filed against the county department of social services, 
alleging that its failure to intervene on Joshua's behalf was a violation of due process. DeShaney 
v. Winnebago City Dept. of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). Most striking was Justice Black-
mun's heartfelt dissent in which he writes: "Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an 
irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who 
... did essentially nothing." 109 S. Ct. at 1012-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Poor Joshua," 
indeed. These two simple words are among the most eloquent in recent Supreme Court history. 
66. As Duncan Kennedy has said, "For any given factual conflict of rights, the doctrinal 
structure will offer a choice of categorizations; the techniques of reasoning that are supposed to 
tell us which choice to make will themselves reproduce that choice at another level." Kennedy, 
The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 360 (1979). 
67. See, e.g., Law, supra note 63, at 227-28 (arguing that the basis for negative attitudes 
toward homosexuals is the desire to preserve traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity 
and to uphold the political, market apd family structures premised on gender differentiation). 
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In summary, the rule-of-law model and empathy are not natural, 
inevitable antagonists. American statutory and decisional laws rarely 
are so specific that they require wooden, "unempathetic" results. 
Modern American trial procedures do allow trial lawyers to personal-
ize their clients and tell their stories. 68 The dilemma lies in the realiza-
tions that all stories cannot dominate, and that law often privileges the 
stories of the powerful and drowns out the voices of the weak and 
marginal. We cannot escape this problem of power, or the fact that 
legal decisions must be based on some set of political and moral val-
ues. The concept of empathy does not, I regret, assist us in making 
these hard choices. It does not help solve the underlying issues of so-
cial policy and social justice. 69 It offers, perhaps because of its roots in 
psychology, a new diagnosis for a known condition, rather than the 
much needed prognosis or recommended course of treatment. 
C. The Call for Individualized Justice and the Link to Discretion 
The argument for more empathy often includes a call for more 
"individualized" justice. The claim is that judges should focus more 
on context - the result in this case to these parties - and less on 
formal rationality - squaring this result with results in other cases. 
This means that law must be more open-ended or general, and that 
legal decisionmakers must be given greater flexibility to reach "right" 
decisions. 70 No two applicants for welfare, no two alleged rapists, no 
two tort-feasors or tort victims will have the same story. Accordingly, 
if we want judges to hear these varying stories, and to craft decisions 
that meet individual, contextual needs, then legislators must give wide 
- even limitless - discretion to judges and other legal deci-
sionmakers. The inevitable link between discretion and empathy71 
68. Cf Cunningham, supra note 25. 
69. The problem, of course, is not new. The proposed solution - rejection of legal formal· 
ism - is not new either. Galligan describes the course of the movement away from formalism 
and the obstacles it encountered as follows: 
It was a common theme of the realist and sociological schools of jurisprudence that a wider 
view of the legal domain ought to be taken by casting aside formal, rule-based constraints, so 
that issues of social policy and social justice could be confronted by legal institutions and, 
with assistance from the social sciences, be resolved. The delegation of tasks to specialized 
administrative authorities appeared to answer that call exactly; but it soon became clear that 
the precepts of social justice may be more difficult to determine, communities more divided 
in their interests and values and the contribution of the social sciences more limited. 
D. GALLIGAN, supra note 61, at 70-71 (footnote omitted). 
70. The more one focuses on substantive rationality (specific outcomes) of the law, rather 
than formal rationality (consistent or even-handed application of rules within a system of laws), 
the greater the discretion in that legal order. See id. at 70. 
71. Discretion, in turn, is linked to judicial lawmaking versus judicial law enforcement. The 
question therefore becomes the procedural one of who should decide issues of social policy and 
social justice. The principle of legality suggests a set procedure for these determinations. As 
Selznick phrased it: "Legality has to do mainly with how policies and rules are made and applied 
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thus deserves attention in any discussion of empathy and law. 
A proposal implying that greater discretionary authority should be 
given to legal decisionmakers betrays tremendous faith in the wisdom 
and responsiveness of our decisionmakers. 72 One reason to be skepti-
cal about this faith is that "empathic capacity," as well as other rele-
vant decisionmaking qualities, are unevenly distributed among human 
beings. Official discretion is dangerous. A second reason to resist giv-
ing greater discretion to judges is that American law already affords 
pervasive discretionary authority to judges, administrators, and other 
officials responsible for law enforcement and application. Moreover, 
much of this discretion is standardless and virtually nonreviewable. 
The practical and theoretical dangers of discretion are well known 
and much discussed. As Professor Francis Allen has observed, giving 
discretion to decisionmakers competes with our desire for "a viable 
system of comprehensible authoritative norms that contain and direct 
the exercise of power by judicial, executive, and administrative offi-
cials."73 Perhaps especially in the area of criminal law, convention 
holds that legal order depends upon having a prior, clear statement of 
the legal standard so that potential offenders know when they may be 
violating law and what punishment may follow.74 In American law, 
however, this principle is modified by the practices.of jury nullification 
and prosecutorial discretion, which permit broad opportunities for in-
dividualized reaction to perpetrators. The result has been empathy for 
some defendants, but not for others. An escape from legal formality 
thus can lead, and has led to impressionistic, idiosyncratic, or stand-
rather than with their content. The vast majority of rules, including judge-made rules, spell out 
policy choices, choices not uniquely determined by the requirements of legality." P. SELZNICK, 
LAW, SOCIETY, AND lNDUSfRIAL JusrICE 11 (1969). 
72. I recognize that to embrace even a weak version of the rule-of-law model likewise betrays 
faith in judges. It reflects faith that judges can, and do, by and large follow "law." This means 
both that I believe legal texts have more or less persuasive, or accurate, interpretations and that 
judges should and often do feel constrained by the more persuasive ones. 
73. Allen, The Erosion of Legality in American Criminal Justice: Some Latter-Day Adven-
tures of the Nulla Poena Principle, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 385, 387 (1987). Galligan makes a similar 
point. He writes that "discretionary powers are sometimes considered to undermine an impor-
tant conception of legal authority: the lack of commitment to general decision rules, the conse-
quential merging of political and legal processes, and the diminution in importance of 
adjudication." D. GALLIGAN, supra note 61, at 64. 
74. The undesirability of "wide-open" decisionmaking might be underscored by an example. 
Would law students (or faculty) favor the following disciplinary rule? 
Any faculty member may institute dismissal proceedings against any student for cause. 
"Cause" shall be determined by one faculty judge, according to her discretion. This judge 
shall be appointed by the Dean, but may not be the faculty member who instituted the 
proceeding. 
Or would faculty favor an equally open-ended standard for decanal decisions regarding salaries, 
research leaves, and teaching loads? 
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ardless justice, which may not treat all stories equally. 75 
American society is pluralistic. We do not share one religion, one 
dogma, one concept of justice. At first glance, our heterogeneity 
makes "flexible justice" seem attractive. In order to satisfy the multi-
ple, varying interests there must be elasticity, i.e., discretion, built into 
the system. A closer look, however, indicates that a large number of 
genuinely conflicting interests and views make official discretion more 
troublesome, not less. If our voices truly are different, then deci-
sionmaker flexibility may lead more often to the suppression, rather 
than the release of some of these different voices. "Formalistic" jus-
tice, in the abstract, represents an attempt to avoid the exaggerated 
influence of one particular decisionmaker's personality - or empathic 
capacity - by compelling her to follow stated and necessarily abstract 
legal standards. It also represents our preference for popular, i.e., 
majoritarian, constraint on governmental action. That is, we may 
want someone other than the individual judge to make the rules. 76 
Absent some requirement, i.e., legal rule, to listen, or a predefined way 
of ordering these voices, a judge or other law official likely will not 
hear those people who are culturally, morally, ethnically, or otherwise 
alien to that judge or official. The vague hope that this will not occur 
without dramatic, perhaps infeasible, restructuring of the American 
judiciary (if not of human nature) is overly optimistic.77 
Moreover, as I have indicated, opportunities for individualized jus-
tice and "discretion" - explicit and implicit - already are dramati-
cally pervasive in American law.78 The nature of the modem state, 
and the role of law today within that state, indicate that this current 
call for greater flexibility or "contextualized justice" is an old argu-
75. This point has been emphasized in the empirical and critical responses to the ADR 
movement. See, e.g., Conley & O'Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An Ethnography of Ju-
dicial Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 467 (1988); Delgado, Dunn, Brown, 
Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality, Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Displlte 
Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359; O'Barr & Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Ade-
quacy in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & Socv. REV. 661 (1985). See generally l & 2 
THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (R. Abel ed. 1982). 
76. Cf. Schauer, supra note 62, at 23. 
77. As Professor Allen has cautioned, "Realism teaches us not to expect too much of the 
ethics of state action in any arena." F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 
62 (1981); cf. W. BENNETT & M. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM 
169-83 (1981) (describing the problem of bias in legal decisionmaking as rooted, in part, in the 
difference in storytelling practices among various groups in society). For a provocative look at 
four radically different communities within American society, see F. FITZGERALD, CITIES ON A 
HILL (1981). 
78. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 65-67 (1976); 
Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for 
"Fixed" and "Preemptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978); Vorenburg, Decellt Re-
straint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981). 
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ment wrapped in new words. As the modem state. expanded its au-
thority into broader arenas and attempted to legislate on such complex 
topics as social welfare, environmental protection, and rehabilitation 
of criminals, the goal of "formal rationality" gave way to the desire to 
promote "substantive ends."79 This movement toward more discre-
tionary, contextualized justice has encountered significant obstacles 
and criticism, as the shortcomings and failures of "flexible justice" be-
come apparent. For example, greater discretion in the hands of prison 
officials or officers dealing with juveniles often has not resulted in more 
empathic justice. 80 
Of course, no one denies that discretion is an indispensable feature 
of just law. I again quote Professor Allen, who has observed that 
to deny discretion to those who wield power is to deny to society attain-
ment of those ends that can only be achieved through discretionary exer-
cises of power. Since those ends include many of the most important 
policy goals, goals relating to national defense and to human welfare, the 
objective of a discretion-free policy is doomed before it begins. This be-
ing true, the aspiration of legality confronts the perpetually difficult task 
of guaranteeing officials the freedom of action to deal with situations that 
cannot be anticipated in all respects in advance, insuring that when ac-
tion is taken, it will conform tolerably well to the general norms of mo-
rality and action expressed and validated in advance by the established 
governmental processes. 8 1 
We therefore confront an inescapable dilemma. If we limit discre-
79. See D. GALLIGAN, supra note 61, at 72 (noting that "[i]t has become commonplace that a 
notable characteristic of the modern legal system is the prevalence of discretionary powers vested 
in a wide variety of officials and authorities"); see also R. HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUS-
TICE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY (1987); R. UNGER, supra note 20, at 193-200 (describing the de-
cline of the rule oflaw in the welfare state). See generally THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, 
supra note 75. 
80. See, e.g., M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 19, at 43 ("[T]he contemporary problem 
is not the existence of discretionary government but how, again in Professor Davis's words, 'to 
confine, to structure, and to check' its appropriate exercise.") (quoting K. DAVIS, DISCRETION-
ARY JUSTICE 4 (1969)); Scull, Progressive Dreams, Progressive Nightmares: Social Control in 20th 
Century America (Book Review), 33 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1981) (reviewing D. ROTHMAN, CON-
SCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE AsYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE 
AMERICA (1980)) (describing the often empty promises of the Progressive movement toward 
individualized criminal justice and juvenile reform); see also Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: 
Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 
(1987) (describing the danger of informality in legal procedures); Williams, Alchemical Notes: 
Reconstructing Ideals From Reconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 423 (1987) 
(describing the problem of fair outcomes as not hinging on informal versus formal procedures, 
but on learning to use effectively the signs of the prevailing system of rhetoric in order to obtain 
just outcomes). 
A recent news item underscores the potential complexities of "individualizing" justice. A 
Chinese man was given five years' probation in the beating death of his wife because of "cultural" 
differences - that "explained" his conduct. See Sherman, "Cultural" Defenses Draw Fire, Natl. 
L.J., Apr. 17, 1989, p. 3 col. 1. It is perhaps ironic that the feminist community in particular was 
outraged by the use of this "cultural" defense. 
81. Allen, supra note 73, at 412 (footnote omitted). 
2120 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:2099 
tion in an effort to achieve equality of treatment, then we may limit the 
possibilities of justice in individual cases. Strict rules, strictly fol-
lowed, can become the instrument of the "status quo,"82 and may per-
petuate injustice. But so can open - ended rules, construed by people 
interested either in preserving the status quo or in promoting other 
unjust ends. And, as I have said, some status quo rules may be worth 
preserving, whereas others may be ripe for reform. Discretion may 
license a decisionmaker to ignore the rules we think are worthy of 
support, in favor of her private agenda or personal experiential under-
standing. To choose between "good rules" and "bad rules," or to de-
cide when to depart from a basically good rule in a particular case, 
therefore requires more justification than empathy for the parties. 
III. BEYOND CRITIQUE 
This is familiar territory. We are presented with the ancient and 
perpetual task of balancing two important yet conflicting desires, both 
of which are essential to our sense of ''justice" or "fairness." We have 
always desired rule predictability/clarity/consistency yet also valued 
rule flexibility/responsiveness. The former division between "law" 
and "equity" was a physical, institutional manifestation of these two 
desires. 83 It may have reflected our innate sense that for every rule -
the expression of the privileged status of one interest over another -
there is always an argument that this interest should not always trump 
other interests. So we set rules to guide us and establish the outlines of 
"relevance" and of our priorities, but we do this knowing that in prac-
tice, i.e., concrete settings, we sometimes need to compromise or juggle 
those arrangements within the general parameters of the rules or even, 
at times, outside them. The tension between our competing, even con-
tradictory, desires for clarity and fluidity never will disappear.84 
The empathy writers surely know this. They are well aware of the 
pedigree of this underlying jurisprudential debate. They are familiar 
with the dangers of discretion. They have argued before, talked to, or 
studied enough judges, administrators, and other legal decisionmakers 
to appreciate that Hercules and Solomon are aspirational figures, not 
82. See id. 
83. See P. SELZNICK, supra note 71, at 13 ("Rigid adherence to precedent and mechanical 
application of rules hamper the capacity of the legal system to take account of new interests and 
circumstances, or to adapt to social inequality."). More radical critics of the rule-of-law model 
maintain that it offers ideological support for social and economic inequalities of the liberal capi-
talist systems that emphasize it. Indeed, some writers argue that the sole purpose of the law is its 
ideological function, and that if capitalism disappeared, the rule-of-law would too. For a discus-
sion of these theories, see D. GALLIGAN, supra note 61, at 91. 
84. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 78; M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 19. 
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judicial Everymen. They know, too, that Holmes already described 
many years ago the role of experience in the law, 85 and that American 
law students - probably all of them - are taught his insight. 
If all of this is understood both by empathy writers and their audi-
ence, then something else must be afoot. This talk about empathy 
must be directed toward ends I have not discerned, and spring from 
frustrations with the existing order that I have not identified. 86 I 
doubt that the underlying purpose is simply to rephrase in modem 
terms the old dialogue between formal and substantive justice. 
One likely purpose is to develop further the vocabulary of commu-
nitarianism. The point of reference for communitarians is "the shared 
lives of people,"87 not the "'unencumbered' individual."88 The psy-
chological phenomenon of empathy demonstrates that people can, and 
do, understand and react to each others' experiences. This is an im-
portant observation for a political theory that stresses the intersubjec-
tivity of meaning, the significance of our communal identity to our 
personal identity and the interrelationship of people, rather than their 
autonomy, detachment, and antagonism. 89 
The empathy phenomenon, though, both supports and undermines 
the "shared lives" view of personal identity. As I already have indi-
cated, the psychological literature shows that our empathy capacity is 
limited by our life experiences; we are rimmed and, in some respects, 
stunted people. This means that we can share in only some lives, and 
relate to only some voices. We are part of some communities, but not 
others. I may be bigger than my single physical self, but I am not the 
85. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW l (1881). Indeed, the recent movement toward 
pragmatism as the philosophical key to understanding and evaluating legal principles may signal 
Justice Holmes' emergence as the paradigm modern judge, rather than Dworkin's Hercules. See, 
e.g., Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1377-78 (1988); 
Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 541 (1988). 
86. Or, perhaps I grasp the ends but remain unpersuaded by the method. 
87. Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, l l HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POLY. 625, 630 (1988). 
88. Id. 
89. The observation is also important to feminist scholarship that builds on the Carol Gilli-
gan "different voice" theory of moral development. Minow describes this work as follows: 
Male psychology, feminist theorists argue, is the source in a male-dominated society of con-
ceptions of rational thought that favor abstraction over particularity and mind over body. 
Similarly, the assumption of autonomous individualism behind American law, economic 
and political theory, and bureaucratic practices rests on a picture of public and independent 
man rather than private - and often dependent, or interconnected - woman. 
Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 47, 48 (1988). A focus 
on human connection, rather than separation, necessarily will emphasize aspects of psychologi-
cal, biological, philosophical, and other literature that illuminate the favorable possibilities of 
knowing others. See West, supra note 3, at 859-64 (describing the feminist response to legal 
liberalism and its emphasis on separation). 
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world. Rather, my "self" may resemble the concentric circles that 
appear when a stone is tossed into a lake. The most distinct and pow-
erful circles are clustered tightly at the source (my physical self). Rip-
ples extend beyond that source, but these circles grow more attenuated 
as they extend from the source and, eventually, they disappear. This 
vanishing point - the limit of self and the exhaustion of connection -
is often the beginning point for law.90 
The sense that our law is "unempathetic" thus may stem from the 
fact that our public rulemaking often begins where our shared values 
and community consensus end. Only when we begin to disagree do we 
need legal decisionmakers to order or reconcile our conflicting views. 
If this is the underlying problem, then our law always will seem 
unempathetic, and can hardly be criticized on this basis. Where con-
sensus ends, lines are drawn; and those outside the line - legal losers 
- always will feel unheard and wounded. 
Of course, empathic failure occurs not only because all rules -
even in a more perfect world - involve the exclusion or muting of 
some voices, but also because the rules of our imperfect world consist-
ently privilege some perspectives over others. That is, we tend to start 
with the same "stones" as the source of most of our legal "circles."91 
And this, I believe, is the root of many - but not all - writers' call to 
empathy. It is a desire to be heard - to join in the circle. Again, 
however, this is the age-old problem of power - which is neither 
90. See Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 134 (1973) (observing that 
"the greater the relational distance between the parties to a dispute, the more likely is law to be 
used to settle the dispute."); cf Cover, supra note 64, at 1629 (noting the limits on comparing 
legal interpretation to literature interpretation, insofar as legal interpretation destroys meaning: 
"[A]s long as legal interpretation is constitutive of violent behavior as well as meaning, as long as 
people are committed to using or resisting the social organizations of violence in making their 
interpretations real, there will always be a tragic limit to the common meaning that can be 
achieved."). 
Of course, my assumption that the self knows limits may be wrong. Perhaps those who stress 
intersubjectivity and empathic understanding in law are reacting to developments in scientific 
theory which suggest that "[t]he material world ... no longer appear[s] as a machine, made up of 
a multitude of separate objects, but rather as an indivisible whole; a network of relationships that 
includ[es] the human observer in an essential way." F. CAPRA, UNCOMMON WISDOM: CON· 
VERSATIONS WITH REMARKABLE PEOPLE 18 (1988). 
91. For example, feminist scholarship uncovers and critiques the male reference point that 
often underlies many legal principles. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and 
the State: Toward a Theory of Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983); Minow, supra note 
11; Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 387 (1984); 
West, supra note 3. 
An ironic twist has developed in the feminist scholarship, however, which is pertinent to the 
empathic failure problem. In the political and jurisprudential effort to encourage a broader, 
more representative perspective that includes women's voices, some feminist writing tends to 
define all women as a single category, and the differences among us are, at times, de-emphasized. 
That is, abstract and general categories, which devalue our individual characteristics, appear 
even within movements aimed at escaping categories. See Minow, supra note 11, at 47-50. 
August 1989] Empathy and Law 2123 
made clearer nor less thorny by the empathy theme. Indeed, to best 
further the specific ends that many empathy writers admire, such as to 
reduce discrimination in our society, we would do well to focus on the 
limits of connection rather than our shared lives. If we are mindful of 
the failures of community, and of the hard lines of our personal em-
pathic limitations, we may develop more realistic legal proposals that 
better account for peoples' predisposition not to see beyond their own 
concerns. We also must consider the practical, day-to-day restraints 
on even well-intentioned efforts to understand others.92 The very fact 
of pervasive human suffering in our culture offers a sobering caution 
against unchecked optimism about human kindness. Acts of generos-
ity and charity do happen, but I fear they are not the public or private 
norm.93 
Despite these limitations on our individual and collective empathic 
capacity, however, there is an important "more or less" quality at 
stake here. The jurisprudential message of the call for empathy is an 
appeal for legislative and judicial procedures that permit deci-
sionmakers to reexamine regularly the lines that law draws.94 
Although we "know" at some level that we tend to treat people like 
ourselves better than those outside our spheres of familiarity, we often 
ignore this knowledge. If verbal reminders of this tendency are built 
directly into our legal discourse, they may stimulate legal deci-
sionmakers to reach beyond those tendencies more consistently.95 
92. I wonder, for example, whether academics who favor empathic law have applied these 
ideas to their law school communities. If so, what changes were effected? In particular, what 
rules, if any, were abandoned and/or adopted? 
93. This sentiment is echoed in this recent statement by Schall, relying on Aquinas: "[T]he 
world is not conceived ultimately injustice, even though there is a place for justice in the world." 
Schall, Human Rights As an Ideological Project, 32 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 47, 59 (1987). 
94. This is a vague, essentially hortative, proposal. But it may be necessarily so, given the 
broad and rather unfocused claims of the call for greater "empathy,'' or "passion,'' or "human-
ity" in law. For a similar view, with equally loose criteria for improved judging, see Minow & 
Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37, 50-51 (1988). Cf R. BERNSTEIN, supra 
note 3, at 162-63 (arguing that to conceive of the political realm as based on "the principle of 
dialogue or conversation" is a "powerful regulative ideal that can orient our practical and polit-
ical lives"); Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984) 
(discussing judges' roles as encouraging communal reconciliation among conflicting groups in 
American society through commands that people listen to one another and attempt to notice 
their shared interests); Carter, Bows and Arrows, Bows and Cellos (Book Review), 20 GA. L. 
REV. 793, 798-803 (1986) (reviewing J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 3, and conclud-
ing it simply means we should all continue to talk with open minds). 
95. I think, for example, of how jarring it is to see the word "love" in legal scholarship. 
Roberto Unger and Robin West's writings come to mind. Perhaps my discomfort is analogous to 
that of some business people when words like "child care," "nursery," or "breastfeed" filter into 
the boardroom. 
Good reason exists, however, to be skeptical of the power of new words to change behaviors 
that reflect underlying power arrangements. Again, the irony is revealed through feminist works. 
Mary Daly has done ground-breaking work on the patriarchal conversion of some words, once 
positive and affirming, into negative and pejorative labels. She traces words like "spinster," 
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They also may foster a healthy, perpetual skepticism about prevailing 
categories and legal paradigms. Questions may be raised more often 
about which voices are tuned out, and which voices are given leading 
roles. Legal outcomes that wound may be harder to tolerate, and thus 
more susceptible to reform, if we routinely ask how we would feel if 
we were to suffer that same pain - whether it is the pain of job dis-
crimination, segregation, termination of welfare benefits or some other 
form of loss or unfairness that the law seeks to redress. The new 
words may rekindle our interest in addressing the age-old problem of 
injustice. Moreover, we may better escape the truly dismal fate of ap-
prehending that our present legal order is merely a convention, not 
divinely or rationally ordained, yet thinking it cannot ever be im-
proved or changed. Whether "empathy" is the right word, or the best 
word, or the only word, to further this reformist agenda may not mat-
ter. The spirit behind its invocation seems benign. 
If this is the "point," however, I believe we need not develop fur-
ther the concept of empathy.96 Rather, we need to consider concrete 
proposals for legislative, doctrinal, structural, and procedural reform 
that will encourage greater responsiveness to multiple voices and com-
munities. 97 We should turn to the next, very difficult questions. How, 
for example, should we measure our progress toward a goal of em-
pathic law? What do communitarian rules look like? Who should the 
lawmakers be in an empathic legal system?98 How do we realize, in a 
"hag," and "crone" to their roots, and finds they once had favorable meanings. Over time, 
however, the words became disabling epithets reserved for certain women. See M. DALY & J, 
CAPUTI, WEBSTERS' Frnsr NEW INTERGALACTIC WICKEDARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(1987). One caution to be derived from her work is that new words may not change the underly-
ing arrangements or biases; rather, these new words may be co-opted, transmuted, and redefined 
to reflect the results that best suit the dominant word-wielders' needs. 
96. My feeling at this point brings to mind a Gerald Graff essay, which appeared in the 
Texas Law Review symposium on Law as Literature. Graff was commenting on Sanford Levin-
son's article, in which Levinson argues that interpretations are made by us, not found. Graff 
responds: 
What these theorists insist on over and over again is the Nietzschean idea that interpreta-
tions are made by us and not found, that it is we who have created the standards and norms 
of interpretive truth that we so confidently attribute to the nature of things, and that we 
must recognize our personal and political responsibility for this creation. But taken merely 
thus far, such an assertion is merely a platitude, to which the proper reply is not "No, that's 
not the case," but rather "Yes that's true, but so what?" ... What alternative to current 
interpretive practices ought we take up? 
Graff, ''Keep Off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and Other Indeterminacies: A Reply to Sanford Lev-
inson, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 405, 413 (1982) (footnote omitted). 
97. See, e.g., Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 297-304 (1984) (attempting to make 
concrete "Critical Legal Theory" proposals); see also Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Consti-
tution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1341-49 (1988) (suggesting that legal pragmatism is the appro-
priate foundation for judicial decisions and offers a workable and sensible method for developing 
substantive and procedural rights). 
98. As to who should be the decisionmakers in a more empathic legal system, I assume that 
the argument points in the direction of multiple decisionmakers, e.g., a jury, rather than one 
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workable way, these utopian objectives? Can we do more than tinker, 
yet less than damn? 
Even if we do fashion a new world of legal order, however, the 
principle of legality will not disappear. I may embrace the concept of 
empathy and the possibility of a loving law, but not escape the task of 
assigning priorities among the objects of my caring.99 I may accept 
that logic and meaning can be circular or "dialogic," yet eventually 
need to draw lines - boundaries - around the circles in order to 
end/decide a legal matter. I may recognize that the "whole" and its 
"parts" are inextricably bound, yet still need some concept of the 
"whole" when deciding what to do about a particular legal contro-
versy. Some hierarchy, some linear thinking, and some emphasis on 
consistent application of prior-stated standards seem unavoidable, 
even in any "new-age" law.100 Moreover, this normative and proce-
dural inquiry must take into account existing social and legal arrange-
ments and actual human behavior. 
The guideposts for assigning our priorities are missing in the empa-
thy literature. Indeed, they are missing from much contemporary 
American legal scholarship, 101 perhaps because of the influence of the 
deconstruction school of literary criticism or perhaps because guide-
posts of this sort are too difficult to establish or to defend. The prob-
person. If one's empathy hinges on one's life experience, then more peoples' input into the fact-
finding and law-finding process may increase the chances that the particular litigants will be 
heard and understood. American Jaw reflects this hope in the sixth and seventh amendments, 
which provide for jury trials, and in the concept of a trial by one's "peers." I have argued 
elsewhere that the peer concept, and peer participation, are crucial aspects of our notion of a fair 
jury. See Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? - Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, 
and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 547-60 (1986). Indeed, I use the word "empathy" to 
describe this capacity to understand another person. Id. at 552. My conclusions about the 
proper composition of the Jay jury comport with the conclusions I reach here: that is, empathic 
capacity is unevenly and variously distributed among us. 
99. Empathizing with another person in any robust sense requires tremendous concentration, 
dedication, energy, and - most importantly - time. Taken seriously, this level of interaction 
can be complex and draining, especially when the "other" is in real distress. To empathize fully 
with even one other person can be all-consuming and, ultimately, unsuccessful in many ways. 
Setting priorities helps us to attend adequately to some few others, rather than attend inade-
quately to many other$. Judges' time constraints, among other limitations, suggest they cannot 
reasonably be expected to apply their hearts and minds to every litigant in any deep empathid 
sense. 
100. See Sherwin, supra note 39, at 603-05. 
101. An exception is the work of Unger, who offers a blueprint for institutional and struc-
tural change, which he believes would further his social ideals, or "superliberalism." See, e.g., 
Unger, supra note 19, at 586-602. He defines this superliberalism as a program that 
pushes the liberal premises about state and society, about freedom from dependence and 
governance of social relations by the will, to the point at which they merge into a larger 
ambition: the building of a social world Jess alien to a self that can always violate the gener-
ative rules of its own mental or social constructs and put other rules and other constructs in 
their place. 
Id. at 602. 
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lem of priorities, however, has not disappeared. On the contrary, in 
our complex world of shrinking resources the problem of priorities 
will only grow more fierce. 102 We therefore cannot outrun the practi-
cal-moral task of distinguishing the possibilities of good from the pos-
sibilities of evil. 103 
What I have concluded, based on my reading of the empathy 
strand of legal scholarship, is not that the rule-of-law model is fatally 
flawed or malevolent. Rather, the call to context, at its best, simply 
counsels against complacency. We are admonished to revisit our expe-
rience and feelings, 104 along with other guides to reasoned judgments, 
and to guard against empathic or intellectual blind spots when we con-
struct and critique the legal institutions and standards that govern us. 
Foolish formalism, they caution, is to be feared. But so too, I would 
demur, is unguided emotion. 
Movement in any direction involves choices. Greater receptivity 
to multiple voices and a sharp awareness that our organizing princi-
ples are debatable - perhaps even hideously wrong105 - may illumi-
102. Societies today are becoming more complex, with direct and troubling consequences for 
law and legal theory. Niklas Luhmann identifies three reasons why this complexity has in-
creased. First, there is a diversity of interests, groups and values within societies. Second, sci-
ence and technology have increased the number of possibilities. Third, world economic systems 
today are interrelated. See N. LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER (1979). This last point suggests 
that decentralization of legal/political authority may be an unrealistic proposal, though it might 
further the goal of making law more responsive to individual or community needs. 
103. I am not arguing that we can, or should ever attempt to find "an answer." I am simply 
denying that all things, all results, all stories or conversations, are equal. We need context and 
acontextual categories, immediate sensation and past experience, conformity to rules and ways to 
escape from rules. Stories may ground us in reality and even shape that reality, but we need 
some theory to make sense of our stories. 
104. For an entertaining discussion of the proper role of empathy (he calls it "sympathy") in 
developing moral principles, see Bennett, The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn, 49 PHILOSOPHY 
123 (Apr. 1974). He concludes, as I do here, that the proper course is to "try to keep my 
morality open to revision, exposing it to whatever valid pressures there are - including pressures 
from my sympathies." Id. at 133. 
A far more sophisticated and radical statement of the goal of opening ourselves to new forms 
of meaning and justice is Roberto Unger's. See Unger, supra note 19, at 584-86. 
105. I do not want to live my life, professional or personal, "in a world of broken dreams and 
paper-pushing, of abstractions that have long ceased to be living theory and that, once routinized 
and mutilated, turn into the guiding principles or the empty forms of social practice to which 
they lend the spurious semblance of sense, authority, or necessity." Unger, supra note 19, at 670. 
No one does. But neither do I want all context smashed, all order "unpacked," all received 
authority ridiculed and mocked. I fear that radical skepticism about all "guiding principles" can 
derail any practical effort to define or guide ourselves, as well as each other. Instead, we could 
spend our time in endless imagining of alternatives to any "limiting" conception of ourselves or 
others. It seems to me that we need a starting point - some framework or implicit, shared sense 
of relevance - lest we live our entire lives as my friend Jerry Leavitt would put it, "playing 
handball against a curtain." Moreover, anyone who has experienced times when their life's phi-
losophy - or even some part of it - was truly "deconstructed," knows· that to face perpetual, 
uninterrupted "delegitimation" of all one's assumptions and dreams would be hell on earth. 
False hopes look and feel exactly like real ones, until they are dashed. 
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nate our way. But we need more than a lamp for a mapless journey; 
we also need a compass. 
